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EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
 
The object of the present briefing is to analyse some of the fundamental aspects of the legal 
proposal by the European Commission on the subject of roaming, COM (2006)382 on 12 July 
2006, which proposed to modify the regulation of mobile communications, resulting in important 
reductions of roaming tariffs within the Community.  The briefing examines the efficiency and 
concrete applicability of the measures introduced by the Regulation Proposal, which created the 
“Mechanism of the Domestic European Market” and the envisaged requirements of transparency 
and information on roaming costs charged by mobile network operators (MNOs).  
The briefing consists of four sections, analysing the following issues: Transparency, Technical 
Infrastructure, Overview of Existing Data, and Feasibility of Technical Implementation. 
 
TRANSPARENCY 
Recent studies indicate that more than 40% of European users do not have a clear idea of the cost 
of calls abroad. Excessive roaming costs are the main reason why Europeans use their phones 
less often when travelling abroad, and almost 60% of Europeans would use their phones more 
frequently if international roaming fees were less expensive. 
To keep customers better informed of international roaming prices, Article 7 of the Regulation 
Proposal envisages measures such as providing roaming customers with free voice call and short 
message services (SMS) to provide retail tariff information, as well as periodically informing 
them of applicable roaming charges and pricing variations. 
This section includes an analysis and comparison of the various methods to achieve greater tariff 
transparency, in particular, the “Free pull” (envisaged by Article 7), “Advanced push”, and 
“Hybrid push/pull” systems (see Table 1).  
With the Free pull system (option 3 of Table 1), MNOs offer a free SMS/voice call service to 
their customers, and constantly update them about (substantial) changes in roaming charges. 
Because MNOs would be responsible for all costs, they may increase charges, thus resulting in 
informed customers cross-subsidising uninformed customers who require the service. In 
addition, differentiation in offered services might decrease and less mature markets may be more 
negatively affected. However, the Advanced push system (option 4, in which users receive a 
welcome SMS with information on the recommended network partner, then choose their 
preferred network and receive an SMS with tariff plans) would be too costly for MNOs and quite 
difficult to implement, while the Hybrid push/pull (option 5, in which users receive a welcome 
SMS which offers the option to send an SMS to gather information on available prices); seems 
more economically sustainable for MNOS, as users pay to send an SMS, and it may be more user 
friendly. The analysis suggests that a service providing greater tariff transparency should not 
necessarily be offered to customers for free. 
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TECHNICAL  INFRASTRUCTURE 
This section describes the technical infrastructure of roaming and analyses whether the system 
creates increased costs. International roaming involves the following activities for equipment, 
systems and operations: call data records (CDRs); interconnection and transit infrastructure 
costs; payments for call termination for visited MNO, home network costs; and costs of 
negotiation between roaming partners.  
This analysis estimates that international roaming costs are between 10% and 20% higher than a 
national-only system, a figure supported by a separate estimate that suggests added costs of 
about €0.02–0.03/call. However, current roaming charges are more than 100% higher than the 
national roaming costs. 
To implement tariff restriction according to the Proposal, it would be necessary to update the 
billing systems, the roaming agreements, and the business processes for settings rates. 
In theory this would take three months to complete, but considering possible mandates and legal 
challenges, the process would most likely take one to two years.  
The assessment foresees the following impacts on investments as a consequence of the proposed 
regulation: a decrease in unit cost to customers; a marginal increase in operator costs, 
outweighed by increasing returns; increased revenues with no network or operational expansion; 
and increases in new entrants and new technologies. 
The overall result would be increased social and business benefits, with lower costs of doing 
business across Europe. Existing operators would have increased revenues and traffic, and 
innovation and new entrants would be strongly encouraged. 
 
OVERVIEW OF EXISTING ROAMING DATA 
This section notes the discrepancy between information provided by operators and information 
requested by the Commission to create a complete and accurate summary of the market data. 
Data integrity issues mainly concern market size, pricing and industry costs. The market size 
of the mobile market may have changed substantially from 2005, with fluctuations in roaming 
tariffs and changes in consumer demand patterns. Pricing information is provided through call 
centres, newspapers, magazine, journals, electronic pricing guides and the Internet; however 
there may still be issues of accuracy. The industry has worked on this issue by utilising a 
voluntary Code of Conduct for European operators to enhance the clarity of international retail 
roaming price information for consumers. In order to assess profit margins, the Commission 
services requested specific data from the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) 
Europe Association and from sixteen EU operators, selected to provide a representative sample 
of network size, roaming traffic volume; and membership of alliance networks. The GSMA’s 
claimed rates of nominal inter-operator tariffs (IOTs) may be understated due to nominal IOT 
discounting, which occurs between alliance members. Most operators claim that competition in 
the wholesale market is working and is helping to bring down prices; however, retail prices may 
not always drop when wholesale prices decrease. The Commission calculates that the average 
retail charge for a roamed call is more than five times higher than the actual cost of providing 
wholesale service, and on received roaming calls, operators make retail margins of 300 to 400 %. 
Operators attest that their packages offer good value for money and the total cost of these 
services to consumers has been decreasing; however, there is no clear evidence that any of these 
services are run at a loss, or that roaming prices are justified to compensate for the price of 
cheaper services.  
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FEASIBILITY OF TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION  
Article 5 of the Proposal of Regulation states that the retail price limits envisaged will take effect 
after six months (“The obligations in Article 4 shall take effect six months after the entry into 
force of this Regulation”).  
After an analysis of the measures envisaged by the Regulation, the briefing note concludes that 
the implementation of the transparency measures would be difficult to carry out within the 
expected amount of time. The adoption of this measure, in fact, would need to constantly update 
information on available retail prices of visited network service providers and would need to 
simplify tariff schemes and user profiles to keep down costs. Furthermore, this measure would 
not be easily implemented because the costs of implementation are significant and will be borne 
entirely by MNOs. The impossibility of recovering the cost of setting up the service may lead 
either to an increase in domestic charges or to a reduction in investments. 
Regarding the implementation of the tariff-reducing measures, price-capped roaming regimes 
could be effected reasonably quickly – in three months or so. The time required is that to update 
the billing systems, the roaming agreements, the business processes for setting rates and possibly 
the interconnect systems and any checks on TAP files or possibly raw CDR data, as well as the 
customer-care processes. Billing systems can be updated by reprogramming if they are of the 
previous generation, or by operator resetting and perhaps reconfiguration of rating tables if they 
are of the current generation. However, as capping will require mandates through legislation, 
with potential legal challenges to be processed, a horizon of at least one to two years is realistic. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The problem of high international roaming tariffs dates from mid-1999, when the European 
Commission decided to carry out a sector inquiry into national roaming and make international 
comparisons of some mobile communications operators to assess whether  there were  
infringements  of Article 82 of the Treaty, concluding with the adoption of the 2002 regulatory 
package for electronic communications, which introduced a system of regulatory obligations on 
firms that held a dominant position in the market. The current framework for electronic 
communications provides an analysis procedure for the relevant markets on behalf of the 
national regulator authorities, resulting in the emergence of individual relevant markets 
susceptible to ex ante regulation and, if the conditions occur, the impositions of regulatory 
obligations ex ante on firms in the sector of electronic communications which operate in the 
relevant market. It was in such a context that international roaming, after having been singled out 
as potentially susceptible to regulations ex ante, was included in the relevant markets of service 
in the sector of telecommunications regulated by the Recommendation of the Commission of 11 
February 2003.  
The introduction of international roaming in the relevant markets subject to regulation ex ante 
therefore allows the national regulation authorities, as stated in Article 16 of Directive 
2002/22CE, to impose regulatory obligations on access and on institutions for price checks on 
the firms after having evaluated such a market as effectively competitive. The national 
competition permits the competent authority to sanction anti-competitive behaviour by individual 
firms. 
Recent studies and investigations from the European Commission nevertheless highlight, the 
existence of unjustifiably high international roaming rates, and the ineffectiveness of the current 
regulatory framework which monitors anti-competitive behaviour in the firms.  
Despite repeated warnings and numerous initiatives by the EU Institutions, the prices of 
international roaming rates still remain unjustifiably high: the packages offered by mobile 
telephone operators in response to the input of the EU present excessively high costs which do 
not reflect the actual costs of the operators of such services, and therefore constitute a deterrent 
to the use of mobile telephones by foreign consumers.  
The Regulation Proposal of the European Parliament and the Council (COM) (2006) presented 
by the Commission aims to provide a legal and standard basis for achieving important reductions 
in roaming tariffs within the Community and greater transparency of detailed costs.  
For the suggested instruments to achieve these objectives, the Commission proposes the 
institution of the “Mechanism of the European domestic market”. This measure consists of 
setting limits on common rates for mobile phone calls affected by a host network in the 
Community and destinations in other public telephone networks located within the Community. 
In addition to the instruments used to reduce charges, the proposal foresees specific finalised 
measures to guarantee the transparency of costs, requiring mobile telephone operators to give 
information on costs to their customers when they sign up for the service and to provide regular 
updates, including cases of significant variations in actual costs. 
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1. TRANSPARENCY  
In this section, transparency issues are briefly addressed from the viewpoint of users and mobile network 
operators (MNOs). In discussing transparency issues, we initially adopt a “Greenfield” approach – i.e., we 
assume that there is no price regulation at the retail and wholesale level. When commenting on the likely 
impact of the proposed regulation on users and MNOs, we take into account the potential cumulative effects 
of transparency measures and price regulation.  
 
1.1 Transparency for the end user 
The lack of consumer awareness of costs and available pricing schemes when travelling abroad has been 
confirmed by several empirical studies, and most recently by a Eurobarometer survey published in November 
2006, according to which more than 40% of European users do not have a clear idea of the cost  
of calls abroad, “excessive communication costs are by far (81%) the main reason why Europeans use their 
phones less often when travelling abroad”, and almost 60% of Europeans “would be ready to use their phones 
more frequently when travelling abroad if prices were more attractive”.1 
Against this backdrop, Article 7 of the proposed regulation envisages some transparency measures, such as 
providing roaming customers with a free short message service (SMS) (so-called “pull mode”) and call-based 
retail tariff information, as well as clearly informing them periodically of applicable roaming charges and any 
changes to these. This adds to a number of measures that have already been implemented at EU and national 
levels, such as the creation of a pan-European website by the European Commission in cooperation with the 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) Europe Association,2 and the development of national 
websites by national regulatory authorities (NRAs). Below, we briefly list possible measures for increasing 
retail tariff transparency, and provide an assessment of their likely effects on mobile network operators 
(MNOs), end users and competition in mobile markets.  
 
Methods of achieving greater tariff transparency  
Greater transparency for the end user can be achieved through several (complementary) measures. Options 
that have been considered so far include:  
• the provision of information in paper form;  
• the creation of ad hoc websites at national or pan-European level;3 
• the provision of international roaming charges by means of a 116 number for harmonised European 
services; 
• self-regulatory options that rely on initiatives by individual MNOs or industry associations, aimed at 
simplifying tariff schemes to the benefit of final users;4 and  
• information on tariffs made available through Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) / General Packet 
Radio Service (GPRS) browsing. 
                                                     
1See Special Eurobarometer n. 269, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_269_en.pdf, pp. 14 and 17. 
2 See http://europa.eu.int/information_society/activities/roaming/index_en.htm and http://www.roaming.gsmeurope.org 
3 Currently available websites include the European Commission’s website launched in October 2005, dedicated national websites started by NRAs in 
2006 and the GSM Europe a website launched in July 2006. Larger MNOs also offer recommendations and price information to their subscribers and 
pre-paid users on their websites. Websites are generally useful, as they provide users with a one-stop-shop for information and comparisons of 
international roaming tariffs, and consumers can consult them anywhere where web access is available. However national websites are easier to 
manage and consult than pan-European ones, and are also more informative; pan-European websites only provide an overview of charges, not 
information on specific charges and user profiles. 
4 Examples include the adoption of average/zonal prices (Freemove, Vodafone Eurocall/Passport plans, etc.). A number of European MNOs have 
already started offering services that allow end users to gather sufficient information to select the cheapest foreign network when roaming abroad. 
ERG reports that an Italian MNO adopts a hybrid (“push–pull”) system by sending an SMS to its customers explaining how to obtain information on 
charges in the visited country: the subsequent request (“pull”) is charged at the normal rate of an SMS in Italy but with no charge for receiving the 
information. A Lithuanian MNO uses a similar system, but in addition to the SMS initiated by the user to get the prices (charged at standard IR rates), 
the user is charged by the home MNO a price of 0.45 LTL (0.13 Euro). In the UK, one MNO provides a “pull” service for country-specific 
information, including tariffs (using a short code). The service is free if requested in the UK, and charged at normal rates outside. Most notably, an 
Irish MNO is reportedly trialling a “push” SMS for customers who roam abroad, which – besides providing tariff information – also identifies whether 
the customer is using the cheapest network and, if not, recommends which network to use and the associated cost. The main disadvantage of this 
option is the difficulty of monitoring compliance with transparency obligations by MNOs. On the other hand, such an option – especially if caps are 
maintained both at retail and wholesale level in the final regulation – would encourage MNOs to develop different service bundles for different users – 
i.e., to adopt an efficient versioning of their service bundles to tailor them to end-user preferences.  
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These options, however, were found to be not fully effective, difficult to monitor, or too costly to 
implement.5 Two additional options, both based on the SMS (short message service) tool, are considered to 
be potentially more effective.  
• Information can be provided through a “push” SMS, i.e. an SMS initiated by the customer’s home MNO 
showing tariffs for inbound and outbound calls on the selected visited network. Roamers would receive a 
“welcome SMS” from their home MNO, which alerts them to additional charges for roaming, contains 
information on charges for basic voice calls on the selected roaming network, and suggests where 
additional, more comprehensive information can be retrieved. The technical implementation appears 
quite challenging for a number of reasons. First, an operator-initiated welcome SMS only provides 
information on the specific network which the customer has logged on to: users would then have to face 
the hassle of logging on to several (and possibly all available) networks in order to find the best deal. 
Second, as tariffs vary considerably between operators, and depending on the origin, destination, time of 
day, type of customer contract and services offered, an SMS will hardly provide all the needed 
information within the limited number of characters available (160). Most often, information would be 
limited to service availability – a rather unsatisfactory solution.  
For pre-paid customers, the provision of real-time tariff information is more costly to implement, 
although increasingly feasible from a technical viewpoint. GSM-enabled technologies for advice of 
charge (AOC) are not useful as they can only send one price at a time, and only after the call has 
finished. Advanced intelligent network (IN) technologies (such as “customised applications for mobile 
enhanced logic”, CAMEL) are more user friendly than previous call-back technologies and enable direct 
communication between a home MNO and a visited MNO, in turn allowing operators to offer complex 
discount schemes, based on a variety of factors applied in real time when the user is roaming abroad. 
With CAMEL, the call is monitored and controlled by a node in the home network, which communicates 
with the visited network. When one of the parties hangs up and ends the call, the proper amount is 
debited from the pre-paid account.6 However, deploying CAMEL is quite costly, and inevitably requires 
home MNOs to charge users wishing to use the service.7 The cost of integrating CAMEL functionality in 
the network of one MNO and upgrading the billing and IT system was conservatively estimated at €100 
million in 2001.8 Such cost includes expensive network and software upgrades, the addition of new 
service control points (SCPs), and testing and implementation by all the cooperating networks. For 
example, the cost of new SCPs is estimated at €5 to €8 per subscriber for a customer base of at least 
3 million, depending on the range of functions to be implemented.9 Finally, CAMEL must be supported 
by both the home and the visited MNOs, and may unacceptably delay the call set-up, in turn negatively 
affecting customer experience. For such reasons, some MNOs, concerned about returns on investment, 
have not implemented the technology yet, and those that have implemented it have not considered the 
proposed price regulation when calculating prospective returns. 
• Information can be provided through a “pull” SMS. Under this scenario, customers send a (user initiated) 
SMS to a number reserved by their home operator with a standard code (for example, “INT PRICE”) 
when abroad. In reply, the user receives one (or more) SMS with information on the charges relevant for 
his/her type of subscription. In principle, this solution might prove effective, especially since the 
information provided can be tailor-made and take into account the user’s tariff plan: this, to a limited 
extent, reduces the need to send an enormous amount of information via SMS. However, the technical 
development of a reasonably informative system would entail development costs. As a matter of fact, 
welcome SMSs are currently mostly sent by visited MNOs, not by home MNOs. Implementing a pull 
system would require that home MNOs reserve a number that customers can call when roaming abroad – 
such a service would of course come at a cost for home MNOs. For this reason, the European Regulatory 
Group (ERG) IRTT Project Team recently accepted that the SMS MNOs could charge for use of a pull 
mechanism. The ERG group only recommended that the price of this SMS information service should be 
such as not to discourage its use and should, in turn, be communicated clearly to users10.  
                                                     
5 See the report of the European Regulatory Group (ERG) Project Team on International Roaming Tariff Transparency (IRTT), ERG(05)43 rev 1, 
October 2005.  
6 If one of the parties’ balance reaches zero, the call is automatically disconnected, normally after a warning tone is played. 
7 CAMEL solves the usability problem associated with previous unstructured supplementary services data (USSD) call-back technologies, which 
required users to key in a string of characters following the USSD standard to instruct a service node located in their home network to call them back 
and then connect the called number.   
8 See, e.g., GSM Europe Information Paper, Real Time Information: The Feasibility of Implementation, October 2001.  
9 Giroux (2003). However, €2–3 per subscriber may be sufficient to CAMEL-enable existing legacy equipment without adding many new SCPs.  
10 ERG(05)43 rev1, October 2005, p. 20. 
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In Table 1, we compare five different options for implementation of a push or a pull system. These include 
the option envisaged in Article 7 of the proposed roaming regulation (option 3 in the table).  
 
Table 1 – Comparison of options to increase tariff transparency 
 
Option Effectiveness/relevance Efficiency Implementation, sustainability 
1 SIMPLE PUSH 
User receives a welcome 
SMS with information 
on how to gather data on 
roaming prices. A link to 
a website or paper 
materials distributed at 
points of interest could 
be envisaged. 
Low  
Users would need to gather 
information on the web or from 
paper materials distributed at 
points of interest.  
Potential “junk mail effect” and 
information overload for users.  
No tailor-made information 
related to user profile.  
Medium 
Easy to implement, as it only 
requires minor changes to the 
welcome SMS.  
Implies the setting-up of a 
website or the 
development/distribution of 
guidance materials. 
May require a right to store 
materials at points of interest.  
Low 
Technology is readily available. 
Implementation costs are 
significant and not likely to be 
acceptable to MNOs.  
Difficult to monitor compliance 
with transparency obligations. 
Not user friendly. Users would 
need to find their way through 
complex guidance documents.  
2 SIMPLE PULL 
User decides whether to 
send an SMS to (or call) 
a universal number that 
provides information on 
roaming charges via 
SMS. 
Medium 
Requires the user’s initiative. 
Implies that users are informed 
about available numbers to call. 
‘hassle’ effect is limited as 
users can receive info tailor-
made to their profile. 
Medium 
Service yet to be implemented. 
MNOs could charge for sending 
the info via SMS. 
Need for cooperation between 
MNOs/NRAs to set up service. 
Low 
Implementation costs are 
significant and likely to be passed 
on to users. 
 
 
 
3 FREE “PULL” 
Envisaged by the current 
proposal in Article 7. 
Home MNOs offer a 
free SMS/voice-call 
service to their 
customers, and 
constantly update them 
about (significant) 
changes in roaming 
charges. 
Medium 
Requires the user’s initiative. 
Implies that users are informed 
about available numbers to call. 
“Hassle” effect is limited as 
users can receive information 
tailored to their profile. 
Information may cover all 
available networks. 
Medium 
Service yet to be implemented. 
MNOs cannot charge for sending 
the info via SMS or voice call. 
Home network needs to cooperate 
with MNOs/NRAs to set up 
service and gather information on 
retail prices. 
Might encourage zonal 
pricing/simpler tariff schemes and 
exclusivity agreements between 
operators. 
Low 
Implementation costs are 
significant and will be borne 
entirely by MNOs. 
Need to keep constantly updated 
information on available retail 
prices by visited network service 
providers. 
Need to simplify tariff schemes 
and user profiles to keep down 
costs. 
 
 
4 ADVANCED PUSH 
Users receive a welcome 
SMS with information 
on the recommended 
network partner, then 
choose their preferred 
network and receive an 
SMS with tariff plans 
for its tariff scheme. 
High 
Users receive an alert about 
existing available networks and 
the cheapest partners per 
profile. 
Tariffs are transparent, as users 
receive a single SMS tailored 
to user profile (solves the “junk 
mail effect”). 
Possibility of opting-in specific 
schemes for frequent travellers. 
Low 
Need to enhance welcome SMS 
and update information 
constantly. 
Costs would be significant, and 
vary depending on network 
features and structure of charges. 
MNOs cannot charge for 
welcome SMS. 
Compatible with steering 
technologies and IOT volume 
discounts. 
Medium 
Implementation costs are 
significant and unlikely to be 
recovered/passed-on to end users. 
Users unaware of the cost of 
alternatives. 
Users need to become familiar 
with manual network selection. 
Real-time tariff information 
technology not available on all 
networks. For pre-paid customers, 
only CAMEL is user friendly, as 
opposed to call-back 
technologies. 
5 HYBRID PUSH/PULL 
Users receive a welcome 
SMS which offers the 
opportunity to send an 
SMS to gather 
information on available 
prices for the user’s 
tariff plan or ways to 
opt-in to ad hoc pricing 
schemes for travellers 
(e.g. Vodafone Passport, 
O2, My Europe, etc.). 
High 
Users receive an alert on 
existing available networks and 
the cheapest partners per 
profile. 
Tariffs are transparent as users 
receive a single SMS tailored 
to user profile. 
Possibility of opting-in to 
specific schemes for frequent 
travellers. 
Requires the user’s initiative. 
Medium 
Need to enhance welcome SMS 
and update information 
constantly. 
Costs would be lower than option 
3, as SMS is sent only if user 
requests it. 
MNOs can charge for welcome 
SMS and subsequent information. 
Compatible with steering 
technologies and IOT volume 
discounts. 
Medium 
Implementation costs are 
significant and likely to be 
passed-on to end users. 
Methodology still being trialled. 
Users become aware of 
alternative pricing offers and ad 
hoc schemes. 
Real-time tariff information 
technology not available on all 
networks. For pre-paid customers, 
only CAMEL is user friendly, as 
opposed to call-back 
technologies.  
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Implications for operators and consumers  
A fully fledged push system (option 4) would prove too costly for MNOs and quite difficult to implement. 
Option 5, in contrast, appears at once more economically sustainable for MNOs and more user friendly. If 
this option were implemented, consumers would be alerted and would have the opportunity to gain access to 
a value-added service at a charge. However, already informed consumers would not incur any additional 
costs: only those who need information would initiate an SMS request. This feature avoids both paternalistic 
measures –providing information to all consumers regardless of their needs – and cross-subsidies between 
users, with informed users cross-subsidising less informed ones.11 In order to be effective, such a measure 
may be integrated with other measures, such as comprehensive information on ad hoc leaflets and already 
available websites set up by MNOs, NRAs and the Commission.  
With option 3 (Article 7 of the proposed regulation), uninformed consumers would be better off, as they 
would profit from a free service that provided them with valuable information. Informed consumers, on the 
other hand, might cross-subsidise uninformed ones through greater charges. If MNOs were unable to recover 
development costs through higher prices, consumers would in any event be affected in the medium term due 
to a reduction of investments by MNOs.12 
The likely consequences of option 3 for operators and price setting are as follows: 
• Simplification of tariff schemes: in order to comply with the transparency obligation, MNOs might 
accelerate the already ongoing process of simplifying roaming pricing schemes, with the adoption of 
zonal pricing and flat-rate schemes. This would certainly reduce implementation costs. 
• Charging units: the current proposal to regulate wholesale international roaming charges introduces a cap 
on per-minute charges inclusive of call set-up costs and opt-in fees. MNOs normally charge their users 
per second on domestic calls, whereas for international roaming services the charging unit varies 
considerably. In particular, some operators charge roamers per (indivisible) minute, others choose shorter 
charging intervals such as 15 or 30 seconds, and others have switched to charging by the second. Some 
operators also impose a call set-up (“flagfall”) charge on international roaming calls, but not on domestic 
ones. If they cannot recover development costs for transparency measures mandated by the proposed 
regulation, MNOs might switch back to per minute charging, which allows for increased revenues and 
decreases billing transparency for final users.  
In addition, if the proposed wholesale and retail price regulation is maintained, further effects may also 
materialise as a result of the “pull” transparency obligations:  
• Consolidation and information exchange: MNOs may have an incentive to strengthen their alliances 
and/or consolidate, in order to facilitate the exchange of information on applicable retail prices. 
Typically, the visited network only knows its own inter-operator tariffs (IOTs), not the home MNO’s 
retail tariff rates, let alone user profiles. The current GSM standard does not provide for the transfer of 
relevant information between the host and visited networks. The impact on social welfare is ambiguous: 
on one hand, consolidation and traffic steering can bring low charges; on the other hand, they may 
“compartmentalise” the market and foreclose non-group MNOs, let alone MVNOs, with negative 
impacts on dynamic competition and long-term welfare.13 
• Standardisation of service bundles: as the current price cap is related to maximum – not average – prices 
and charges for receiving calls are eliminated, efficient versioning of service bundles would become 
more difficult for MNOs. The degree of service differentiation on the market would therefore decrease.14  
                                                     
11 As acknowledged by the ERG IRTT Project Team, “the combination of both a push and a pull mechanism would be able to overcome the problems 
… stemming from the fact that consumers could be unaware of the existence of end-user initiated SMS.” 
12 The Commission’s impact assessment acknowledges that, as a result of the current proposal, MNOs may react with a rebalancing of tariffs and/or 
with a reduction of investments.  
13 See, in this sense, ARCEP (2006).  
14 The proposed regulation may disrupt specific pricing schemes adopted by some MNOs to match their customer preferences. This is the case, for 
example, with Vodafone Passport, which is based on very attractive retail prices for outgoing calls but also on charges for incoming calls. This would 
introduce a degree of homogeneity in a market that is now developing highly differentiated service packages.  
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• Collusion: service differentiation and lack of transparency of (discounted) IOTs charged by MNOs have 
so far convinced most NRAs that joint dominance is impossible in the market for wholesale international 
roaming. With the double cap and a pull system, more information on current retail prices would be 
available to all MNOs, and in turn information on wholesale prices would become easier to collect.15. In 
turn, all the conditions for join dominance under the CFI Airtours judgment would be restored in the 
market.16 Of course, the extent to which joint dominance can lead to higher prices depends heavily on 
whether the costs of providing the service for MNOs are below the cap. If this were the case, MNOs 
might have an incentive to collude tacitly in setting prices at the maximum possible level allowed by the 
regulation.  
As a final remark, the impact of option 3 coupled with a double cap regime would vary significantly between 
MNOs and member states. In particular, less mature markets with higher network costs and MNOs with a 
small customer base would be more negatively affected than larger MNOs in more mature countries and 
MNOs forming groups or alliances. 
 
1.2 Transparency: the operators’ side 
Nominal IOTs are generally very transparent for operators, as they are made available to all operators (on a 
confidential basis) on the Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA) Infocentre. 
However, in practice IOTs are much less transparent due to volume discounts, traffic re-direction techniques 
– such as assisted/managed roaming, SIM application toolkits and over-the-air (OTA) programming17 – and 
different billing arrangements. In this section, we assess whether a greater transparency of IOTs would lead 
to more competitive markets.  
Perhaps the most common argument for regulating wholesale international roaming charges is the risk of 
tacit collusion between MNOs to maintain high IOTs. Many alternative explanations have been proposed by 
economists for such collusion.18 Authoritative commentators have recalled that, at least until early 2004, the 
limited availability of traffic steering techniques, the transparency of nominal IOTs and the non-
discrimination clause included in the GSM Standard International Roaming Agreement (STIRA) have been 
major causes for the lack of price competition in the market for wholesale international roaming.19 Today, 
however, the situation appears radically different:  
• Until a few months ago, any attempt by an MNO to reduce IOTs would probably not have caused an 
increase in traffic volumes, as visited networks were randomly selected by the roaming customer. Today, 
with at least 80% of the traffic is non-random but rather selected by the customer, and there is a growing 
consumer awareness of retail tariffs, MNOs will have a much greater incentive to negotiate better deals 
with preferred network partners; this would be the only way to offer end users more attractive 
packages.20 
• Under the STIRA non-discrimination clause, each operator applies the same terms and conditions in its 
international roaming agreements, i.e. it supplies its wholesale services at the same price, independently 
of the counterpart. Given such constraints, it is easy to understand why operators have decided to focus 
on alliances, traffic re-direction and volume discounts on nominal IOTs: discounted IOTs are in fact not 
subject to the non-discrimination clause.  
Against this background, increasing transparency of IOTs actually paid by home networks to visited 
networks would not lead to a more competitive environment. Interestingly, the lack of transparency in 
discounted IOTs and the impossibility of retaliating have convinced many NRAs that no joint dominance or 
other collusive behaviour could be sustainable.21 In addition, IOTs are becoming much less important, as a 
growing proportion of traffic is internalised within groups or cross-border alliances.  
                                                     
15 Article 4 of the current proposed regulation introduces a retail cap equal to 130% of wholesale tariffs.  
16 Case T342/99.  
17 Today, steering techniques reportedly allow MNOs to steer more than 80% of their traffic abroad. See, e.g., ARCEP (2006) p. 22, and the 
Commission’s impact assessment, COM(2006)382 final, p. 24.   
18 See, e.g. Valletti (2004); Stumpf (2004), Tsyganok (2005) and Lupi and Manenti (2006). 
19 See Valletti (2004). 
20 See, for a formal demonstration, Salsas and Koboldt (2002).   
21 See AGCOM (2006), FICORA (2005), ComReg (2006), PTS (2006) and NPT (2006). Contra, see ARCEP (2006).  
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Such alliances have profited from increasingly sophisticated steering techniques to offer lower prices to their 
end users.22  
A trend towards increased price competition in the setting of wholesale international roaming tariffs is likely 
to be observed in the future, but this will depend more on technological developments than on the proposed 
regulation.  
 
1.3 Concluding remarks 
The transparency measures contained in the Proposal on international roaming charges would exert an 
unclear impact on consumers and operators. Given the significant development costs for most MNOs – 
especially in countries where pre-paid customers prevail – the free provision of tariff information may lead 
informed roamers to subsidise uninformed ones. If the costs of setting up the service cannot be recovered, 
this may lead either to an increase in domestic charges or to a reduction in investments. Overall, the 
regulation may also lead to cross-border industry consolidation and alliances, and a loss of valuable service 
differentiation. On the operators’ side, there seems to be no need to increase the transparency of IOTs. This 
may, if anything, stimulate collusive bargaining if costs are below the caps selected by the Commission.  
Overall, if retail and wholesale caps are maintained in the final proposal, any requirement to impose costly 
transparency measures free of charge should be carefully considered under the proportionality principle: if 
price caps are meant as “safety nets” for consumers, then the opportunity to gather additional tariff 
information should not necessarily be offered for free. Likewise, with burdensome transparency measures in 
place, the need to impose retail price regulation becomes less evident.  
                                                     
22 Notable examples are Vodafone Passport and the recent announcements by the members of the Freemove Alliance. As reported by the European 
Commission, some large EU operators are already charging wholesale tariffs close to €0.45. 
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2. TECHNICAL ISSUES ON INFRASTRUCTURE  
In this section we analyse the theme of the technical infrastructure, answering a series of questions.  
 
2.1 Does technical infrastructure cause higher roaming costs? 
MNOs argue that high international roaming prices mainly result from the increased costs of technical 
infrastructure and its operation. To assess this claim we must answer several questions: 
• Is the handling and billing of an international call more expensive than a national call and, if so, by 
how much?  
• What technical infrastructure elements are required for international roaming?  
• What are the actual levels of extra costs for roaming and the likely future costs of developments? 
• What does a comparison of international prices with the corresponding levels of national pricing 
show?  
However, data to answer these questions are not publicly available since they are considered commercially 
confidential. If national regulatory authorities possess such data, they will not disclose them. Consequently, 
one can only assess the operators’ claims by going back to first principles, examining the process and its 
components, and estimating any additional capital and operational expenditure (CapEx and OpEx).23 
 
2.2 The roaming business process 
International and national roaming is determined by the European GSM interconnect process. The 
operational basis is set out in a roaming agreement between two network operators. When a subscriber enters 
a foreign country, the mobile handset accesses the visited network. A request for service is detected by the 
network and the handset is recognised as not being registered with the local home location register (HLR). 
The originating home network is then identified, using the international mobile subscriber identifier (IMSI) 
number in its SIM card, and contact is made with the home network to request service information on the 
roaming handset (specifically, authorisation to roam and credit status), and all roaming call details are 
returned to the home operator, as shown below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
23  To get data on the cost of roaming, some interviews with key players were undertaken. Generally, there is enormous reluctance in the 
telecoms industry to give real information about the key questions. Also the regulators are bound by various confidentiality requirements, even if they 
have data. Thus any cost analysis had to be made independently, supported by trade press, as applicable. 
SCF  ASSOCIATES  Ltd  2006  all rights reserved      Commercial in confidence 1
SCF
Mobile Roaming Infrastructure  analysis – GSM and UMTS roaming architecture
Home
network
Billing system(s)
Interconnect A
Core network
Metering 
elements
HLR Home location register
CDR  Call data records
VLR Visiting location register
TAP Transferred account procedure
* Specifically IMSI - International mobile subscriber identifier
VLR
HLR
SIM card
Identifiers* Fixed network (PSTN etc)
Fixed line phone
ID registered for 
current 
subscribers
Billing details
under roaming
agreements
as TAP file
ID registered 
for  visiting 
subscribers
Transit 
network (s)
International
calls
Roamed (visited)
network
Interconnect B Billing system(s)
Register ID
Core network
Metering & discovery
elements
CDRs
VLR
HLR
SIM card
Identifiers*
SCF ASSOCIATES  LTD
Local
and 
international
calling via 
visited 
network
IP/A/ITRE/NT/NT/2006-17
                Page 8 of 25
                                             PE 382.177
  
2.3 The additional cost items for roaming in the technical infrastructure 
International roaming involves the following activities for equipment, systems and operations:24 
• Collection and transport of call data records (CDRs) with costs of retail billing for roaming 
subscribers; this may include specific real-time systems (e.g. for pre-paid customers) such as 
CAMEL. 
• Interconnection and transit infrastructure costs for international calls, with payments to transit 
carriers. 
• Payments for call termination for visited MNO, at wholesale prices, with discrepancy resolution. 
• Associated additional home network and business systems costs, including customer-care operations.  
• Costs of negotiation and upkeep of roaming agreements with a large number of roaming partners, 
although many may be implemented via the incumbent fixed-line operator and save costs. 
 
2.4 Should technical infrastructure cause higher roaming costs?  
The cost items for roaming listed above would not necessarily result in significantly higher infrastructure 
costs. Rather, the issue is whether international roaming calls have a different and higher cost than national 
“offnet” calls – i.e. those terminated on another network nationally, either fixed or mobile. It is reasonable to 
expect increased network and support systems for international roaming capacity, but it is questionable 
whether there is a large difference in cost for this type of expansion over that required for a national increase 
in traffic minutes. First indications are that any increase would be a fraction rather than a multiple of current 
national real costs. We now examine this further. 
 
2.5 What is the nature and actual level of extra costs for roaming and likely future costs?  
The nature of these extra costs is for network and billing systems to cover international call transport, with 
wholesale invoicing and retail billing. Approximate high-end figures for additional CapEx and OpEx for a 
medium-sized operator (10 million subscribers) are shown below. 
Note: Assumes 5% of 10m subscribers roam, with 1 call/day, i.e. approximately 150m calls/year of 2 minutes (OECD average); all 
calls involve an international transport element, not just local visited roaming, which would cost far less; the MNO has interconnects 
and roaming agreements with visited MNOs directly and not just via the incumbent fixed-line operator which carries the calls 
internationally (such bulk agreements can be at a lower cost than with the visited MNO and also reduce or remove associated 
management costs). 
                                                     
24 Some MNOs assert that other, non-network, costs are also essential elements – such as sales, marketing, discounts and incentives, handset costs, 
customer care, administration extra cost of capital for network assets (eg. Vodafone in its submission to the 2002 UK Competition Commission 
report). However, we would argue that such costs should not be included since their attribution to roaming is vague and in any case their actual 
contribution to international roaming costs is likely to be small.  
Cost item (maximum cost case for all calls) Order of CapEx (€) Order of Annual OpEx (€) 
Additional network capacity 5m (or 1m/yr, 5yrs) 10m 
Electronic Data Interchange system for TAP files 2m 2m 
CAMEL for home network 15m 3m 
Rating engine enhancement 5m 5m 
Interconnect billing system 7m 10m 
Extra customer care 5m 10m 
Wholesale termination charges 2m 25m (0.08€/min,150m x2min 
calls) 
Wholesale international transit charges 1m 20m (0.05€/min,150m x2min 
calls) 
International wholesale accounting for TAP files, invoices etc 1m 3m 
Increased fraud risk as detection delay with periodic invoicing  10m 
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The possible effects of scale on small versus large MNOs, and on MNOs operating in sparsely versus densely 
populated areas, are summarised in the table below. 
 
2.6 By how much would technical infrastructure cause higher roaming costs?  
The proportion of calls that are international roaming calls is typically 1–5% of traffic (Joseph, 2006). 
However, to ensure that we do not underestimate costs, we have assumed below that 10% of calls handled by 
the MNO are in the international roaming category. The impacts of international roaming on CapEx and 
OpEx are of three main types, all varying widely with the volume of calls, resulting in the increased costs 
shown in the table below. 
 
Cost type, both OpEx and CapEx  % cost increment over no international 
roaming 
Type 1. Increased capacity for international roaming  10% CapEx and OpEx 
Type 2. More expensive systems for int’l calls 5–10% CapEx and OpEx 
Type 3. Different and specialised operations and systems 5–10% CapEx and OpEx (e.g. for CAMEL) 
TOTAL 20–30% both CapEx and OpEx 
 
Overall, we estimate the potential increased costs for international roaming at between 10% and 20% above a 
national-only system. Moreover, additional costs for international SMS would be expected to be smaller 
proportionately as the infrastructure extensions are less.25 26 
                                                     
25 Using the figures in the table in Section 2.5, we could also give a flat-rate cost with some €98m OpEx and €12.6m Capex per year payback, spread 
over 150m average calls, or some €0.73 per average call of 2minutes, or 0.37 Euro/min – but this assumes an international element on all calls, a 
maximised OpEx and a relatively low call volume.  A median realistic figure could be far lower. Comparison with mobile calls via third-party 
rediallers who buy wholesale and resell retail gives far lower rates.  For instance, using International Callchecker on 02 January 2007, a UK call to a 
mobile in France cost from €0.10 to €0.14/minute (http://callchecker.moneysavingexpert.com/intcallchecker/index.php). 
26 It is conceivable, however, that these costs would be offset by increased revenues and other efficiencies: a) possible additional revenues resulting 
from higher calling patterns of roamers, if pricing were adjusted; b) increased efficiencies of the national networks and systems utilisation with 
increased volume; c) impacts of software economics on operations – the cost of billing can be set as constant per subscriber and per call; in fact it 
follows an increasing returns curve of lower cost per unit produced (Forge,  2006). 
Large MNO Small MNO 
More likely to use heavy-duty billing and customer-care 
tools (e.g. CAMEL for real time pre-paid) but additional 
capacity is paid back in extra volume of business. 
Likely to use lightweight (web-based) systems which are 
low cost for real time pre-paid. Also more likely to try to 
offload as much of processing (and perhaps the complete 
billing cycle) to a partner – either the roaming partner 
MNO or a third-party billing specialist, whichever offers 
the lowest cost for roaming and the processing of TAP 
files. 
Densely populated area Sparsely populated area 
Requires more infrastructure at the billing and activation 
provisioning level as a dense urban and cosmopolitan 
area will have more roaming visitors. However this is 
compensated for by the increased revenues 
As roaming detection and metering would usually occur 
above the RAN (radio access network), sparse density 
would tend to require lower and slower server processing 
power for requests for service activation and for handling 
CDRs, so the overall additional costs of roaming should 
not become disproportionate. Again, third-party billing 
solutions may also be attractive. 
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2.7 An alternative estimate from a software supplier perspective 
These “ball park” figures can be supported by examining a further approach, that of the telecoms billing 
software industry.27 This alternative estimate reveals about €0.02–0.03/call of added cost.28  
 
2.8 Comparison of international costs with their corresponding level of national costs  
Comparing today’s international roaming prices in the table below with national calls, we can see that to 
roam in Germany from France involves high RPP (receiving party pays) charges for the pre-paid customer, 
of some €0.65/minute as well as a 122% mark-up on the costs to place calls to France, with a 185% mark-up 
for pre-paid customers. 
Cost of a four-minute peak mobile voice call for a French Orange customer roaming in Germany 
 Customer price for 4-minute call 
Roaming in Germany (on T-Mobile)a Pre-paid (€) Post-paid (€) 
Calling home 4.00 (€1/min) 4.00 (1€/min) 
Being called from home 2.60 (€0.65/min)) 2.72 (€0.68/min) 
National callb for comparison 1.80 (€0.45/min) 1.40 (€0.35/min) 
Sources: aTariffs: Roaming Around Europe, http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/roaming/tariffs/index_en.htm  
bhttp://mobile.orange.fr/0/visiteur/PV?PS=GEHPACCRTS&TOP=O  
From our brief analysis, current roaming charges are high in comparison with costs. Our analysis suggests a 
reasonable mark-up of about 30% over national call costs, while current roaming charge mark-ups are more 
than 100% of the national call costs. The current high mark-up gives scope for competitive price cutting.29 
 
2.9 Are there alternative technical solutions to address geographical difficulties/anomalies?  
Alternative technical solutions include:  
• Using Internet-based systems for management and billing of packet-based mobile services such as 
GPRS. In similar fashion to the alternatives to the expensive IMS (IP multimedia subsystem) for 3G 
and fixed mobile convergence, Web-based technology can be used to provide a cheaper version of 
CAMEL functionality. There is also the possibility over the next five years that new types of 
operator will enter the roaming market, using Skype-style voiceover IP technology for the 
international segment for international mobile calls. This requires that the service providers are 
allowed to connect by the MNOs at each end and to compete freely.  
• The SIM application toolkit – allowing preferential selection to be preset to the lowest-cost IOT in 
each country – which encourages visited network operators to offer discounts in return for preferred 
roaming status (Stumpf, 2001). This beats the current averaged retail roaming prices (which offer a 
single rate for roaming). 
                                                     
27 Basing a comparison on a telecoms billing software company is valid for the following reasons. Up to 50% of infrastructure investment and annual 
turnover of a mobile network can be in billing – the cost of providing and maintaining the billing systems (Swan, 2003). Overall costs depend 
principally on: number of subscribers, network infrastructure type (circuit v packet switched, fixed wireline mobile), range and types of services, 
business processes, billing integration to OSS/BSS, etc. Staff form the major portion of operational costs, for up to several hundred people, which, 
with other process costs, makes billing-related OpEx a significant part of total OpEx. Running the billing systems includes tailoring them for special 
customer requirements, customer contact and care, cross-checking the input data (CDRs) and fraud management; all are labour intensive. Post-
processing the bills (printing and posting bills to subscribers) is additional.  
28 A rough calculation can be made for a mid-size MNO (10 million subscribers) based on average values of software and processing of around €10m 
per year for CapEx over 5 years for billing, mediation and interconnect systems, plus some €20m per year in OpEx for staff, etc. Alternative cost 
measures for billing software are sometimes calculated on a price per subscriber, which varies by complexity of the billing application. For a full-
service MNO or fixed telco billing system, US$5–10/subscriber is usual, so a 10-million subscriber billing system might cost US$50–100m equivalent 
to €7.5–15 m per year over 5 years. At 50% of infrastructure investment, total infrastructure cost range is €15–30m per year. An increase of 10% for 
international roaming would put the extra infrastructure cost at € 1.5–3m per year. Spread over a 5% roaming population (i.e. 0.5 million roaming 
subscribers) who make, say, one call per day, this would increase roaming charges for infrastructure and operations say by the top-end figure of €3m. 
Spreading this over some 150 million calls/year gives approximately €0.02/call of added cost. Adding further costs of CAMEL, at some €20m spread 
over 5 years, would add €0.03 to each call. 
29 This is in line with INTUG (International Users Group) findings following its investigation of international roaming (Antocicco, 2006) – for a 
medium length call of two minutes in Rome against the same call in a foreign city, Budapest: cost in Rome: €0.27; cost in Budapest: €1.12 via same 
operator – an increase of 315%; cost in Budapest: €4.00 via different operator: increase of 1381%. 
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• For pre-paid roaming, the ability to “top-up” abroad is an additional necessary feature but is usually 
lacking. This problem could be solved by bilateral agreements on top-up schemes between roaming 
partners and /or a European clearing house, operated by the industry or by commercial third parties, 
with location-enabled services such as “where is my nearest top-up kiosk/shop”. 
• There is also the option of moving to Bill and Keep as in an ISP peering solution, as proposed by 
Littlechild;30 although some might not consider this a technical solution, it does simplify billing. 
 
2.10 Probable time horizon for the spread and/or implementation of such alternatives 
Price-capped roaming regimes could be effected reasonably quickly – in three months or so. The time 
required is that to update the billing systems, the roaming agreements, the business processes for setting 
rates, and possibly the interconnect systems and any checks on TAP files or possibly raw CDR data, as well 
as the customer-care processes. Billing systems can be updated by reprogramming if they are of the previous 
generation, or by operator resetting and perhaps reconfiguration of rating tables if they are of the current 
generation. The actual time required (including testing) varies from a few hours in the latter case to perhaps 
days or weeks in the former. Modifying the roaming agreements and business processes, with retraining, 
should take around a month to six weeks, for both billing and CRM/customer care in parallel, with sales and 
marketing communications also in parallel. This is a typical timescale for a new mobile service product to be 
rolled out to market. However, as capping will require mandates through legislation, with potential legal 
challenges to be processed, a horizon of one to two years at least is realistic.  
There is also another possible retarding factor in that the larger GSM operators, and in particular those with a 
pan-European footprint, will ask for lower charges only in exchange for preferred roaming status. Such a 
move could discriminate against mobile operators in downstream retail markets that do not have a pan-
European footprint and so lack bargaining power. This issue will require EU-wide regulatory measures by the 
EC through NRAs. However there should not be a hindrance to price competition. The anti-discrimination 
rules contained in licences, competition law or the GSM international roaming framework should not be 
applied in a way that impairs the continual downward adjustment of wholesale roaming charges through 
competition. Moreover, market forces, if allowed to operate by the NRAs, may also tend to work against 
preferential situations for the largest MNOs.31 
 
2.11 Likely changes in investments as a consequence of the proposed regulation  
In assessing likely changes in investments we should first note that we lack a common European mobile 
roaming zone. International roaming falls outside the jurisdiction of national regulatory authorities and, so 
far, the rules governing the single European market have not been applied. Note that when operators club 
together to form a single and dominant significant market power, then the objectives of operator and citizen 
diverge widely. Consequently, wholesale controls alone are unlikely to be effective. The solution is 
regulation of wholesale and retail pricing as soon as possible. As infrastructure costs for national and 
international activities are not very different – with the latter perhaps 20% higher – roaming should soon 
become available across Europe with similar tariff levels to home-country prices, being based on fixed 
network to mobile network termination rates. The effects on customer call behaviour and therefore revenues 
and investments could be seen in the short to medium term (one to three years). 
Also, as soon as is practical, MNO mark-ups will have to be capped as the operators will tend to exploit 
customer ignorance. They will tend to form implicit cartels that set similar prices, claiming these are the 
“market-rate”. Our assessment is that roaming regulation impacts on the mobile business would be most 
positive for investment uptake: 
                                                     
30 Littlechild, S.C. (2006); earlier version available at http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/pls/portallive/docs/1/43006.DOC. 
31  Here we note that arbitrage by roaming brokers, new entrants and wider geographical markets on the retail roaming level would tend to work 
against preferential situations for the largest MNOs. 
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• A decrease in unit cost to customers, promoting more cross-Europe traffic with a significant increase 
in calls, as prices are lower, stimulating investment where needed.32 This would have continuous and 
long-term effects in stimulating new rounds of investment. 
• A marginal increase in operator costs to handle increased international loads, which will be far 
outweighed by the increasing returns from the improved overall operator efficiencies as network 
utilisation rises, with higher revenues. This would be a short-term requirement requiring immediate 
investment, but with long-term effects and short to medium-term payback. 
• Increased revenues will also occur without any network or operational expansion as shares of 
roaming calls entirely within a visited country are paid back to the home network operator. This 
effect could appear in the short tem but would tend to promote investments in the long term. 
• A major increase in calling volume following a reduction in MNO margins on roaming calls will 
stimulate investment for new entrants and for new technologies able to challenge the incumbent 
cellular MNOs with new lower fixed costs. These would be following the lead of “challenger” 
MNOs such as Sprint in the USA that introduced widespread WiMax technology. This might occur 
in the medium to long term, although there could be far faster reaction from the market if the new 
adopters such as Sprint flourish and prosper, especially if the large fixed-line operators (e.g. BT) see 
this as a deciding factor for their major business cases, for national WiFi or WiMax coverage, which 
may centre on low-cost IP calls for cosmopolitan hotspots. 
The overall result would be increased social and business benefits, with lower costs of doing business across 
Europe. Existing operators would have increased revenues and traffic, and as the size of the pie expands, 
innovation and new entrants would be strongly encouraged 
 
2.12 Conclusions 
From our brief analysis, we see that current roaming charges are very hard to justify from a cost-based point 
of view. The range of charges that could be added in marketing, sales and other elements is endless, but the 
true cost is perhaps only obscured by these. We cannot see how operators can justify the charges for roaming 
that are up to several times the national roaming price. A more appropriate mark-up for roaming might well 
be some fraction of the national price for termination by another MNO or fixed-line operator, perhaps of the 
order of 20% to 30% extra at the most. Our overall conclusion is that the MNOs do not make true roaming 
costs public. Only regulation or strong new competition in roamed services, from new entrants, types of 
services and technologies, are likely to change this. 
In view of the basic costing and price differences, we suggest that an analytic audit using cost-based 
accounting for a blended offering across several types of MNO would be in the interest of the EU citizen, to 
arrive at the true costs. It should be carried out within a minimal timeframe (an order of months) and in 
parallel with any other directives on roaming pricing, rather than delaying them. 
                                                     
32 There is certainly evidence of a latent demand; a Eurobarometer survey finds 59% would use their mobile phones more when travelling abroad, if 
prices were lower while 15% of travellers switch off their mobiles when on holiday abroad or do not take them. 
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3. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING ROAMING DATA  
The limited degree of integrity and completeness of the market data has created debate regarding the analysis 
conducted in the Commission’s impact assessment. The Commission has voiced its view that the operators 
are not providing comprehensive information for a full assessment of the roaming market. On the other hand, 
operators insist that they have given the appropriate data.  
Data integrity issues mainly concern market size, pricing and industry costs: 
 
3.1 Inferences on market size data 
The estimate of consumer welfare indicated in the Commission’s impact assessment may be relevant for 
previous years but may not reflect a precise scenario for the years to come. The actual size of the roaming 
market remains a moving target as demand, supply, costs and prices are in constant flux. The market size of 
the mobile market is likely to have changed substantially from 2005, with fluctuations in roaming tariffs and 
changes in consumer demand patterns.  
Due to such factors, data analysis in impact assessment of regulation is not the sole basis of evaluation. 
Broader impacts and qualitative effects are of equal relevance. Nonetheless concerns have arisen regarding 
the data used for the actual size of the retail and wholesale markets and the calculated benefits of EU 
regulation.  
 
Market data 
The EU regulatory model aggregates retail revenues from roaming services, which according to the GSMA 
can be estimated to have reached €8.5 billion in 2005. The figure is made up of €3.5 billion for the wholesale 
market and €5 billion for the retail market. The total roaming market is 5.7% of the total mobile industry 
revenues, which is estimated at around €150 billion.  
 
Consumer welfare estimates 
Using this estimate of the roaming market, the retail and wholesale regulation policy option delivers the 
greatest benefits. The resultant consumer surplus would be between €5.23 and €5.96 billion. During the 
consultative process, the GSMA said that the relevant market size for the calculation of regulatory impact on 
the consumer should be the retail market portion of €5 billion per year. Adopting this figure alone would 
reduce the incremental change in consumer welfare of the Commission’s proposal, relative to the no 
regulation option by almost half. The figure also leads the estimated total welfare to drop from €619 million 
to €317 million. 
 
3.2 Pricing data integrity 
The complexity of pricing structures for the different mobile network operators compounds the problem of 
collecting reliable data on prices. Determining the roaming prices could depend on permutations of as many 
as fifteen available mobile tariffs, two or more promotion plans, time-sensitive pricing structures, and 
different wholesale pricing agreements for the twenty-seven EU member states.  
 
Average price per minute 
There is debate on the use of the average price per minute for roaming, because of deviations from the 
average prices of pre-paid and post-paid tariffs for different operators and different countries. The 
Commission’s impact assessment dated July 2006 quotes €1.15 per minute as the average roaming price. The 
EU model takes an estimate of aggregate EU per minute wholesale and retail prices, which is based on data 
provided for the purposes of the impact assessment by various MNOs and NRAs. 
On the GSMA world website the average roaming price in Europe is quoted at €0.83 per minute. The figure 
is calculated by dividing €5 billion of retail revenues by 6 billion minutes of roaming traffic.  
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The Commission’s impact assessment states that the typical retail charges for a post-paid customer range 
from around €0.80 per minute to around €1.30 per minute on average, while charges for pre-paid roaming are 
around 25% higher.  
The disparity in price ranges from the average mark is to be highlighted. The high level of roaming prices is 
evident from the differences in prices that apply for apparently similar calls that are not represented by the 
figure of the average price per minute. A UK customer can expect to pay between €0.86 per minute for a one-
minute call from France to over €1.75 for the same call from Slovenia. Even greater deviations from average 
are found in the case of a customer from Malta roaming in Latvia, who would pay over €2.20 per minute.  
 
3.3 Information on roaming tariffs 
Network operators provide detailed pricing information through their call centres, and by publishing their 
price lists in newspapers, magazines and journals in each country. Some operators have launched electronic 
pricing guides, which will automatically appear when customers access the Internet via their mobile phones. 
Information on roaming prices is publicly available on the Internet via the EU Information Society’s portal 
for roaming, the GSMA Europe website, and the sites of the respective countries’ mobile network operators. 
Undertaking a price match through prices obtained from the different websites is difficult, because of 
variations in snapshot dates, billing units and the degree of information they offer on customised tariffs. The 
EU site updates roaming prices every six months and quotes peak time rates. The GSMA Europe site 
provides comprehensive pricing information by country, operator and tariffs, giving the most advantageous 
roaming price for a two-minute call from a mobile to a fixed line. Both the EU and the GSMA sites publish a 
disclaimer that their information should be used only as a tool for comparison purposes and that consumers 
should verify actual prices with operators. 
When checking prices with operators, there may still be issues of accuracy between the billed figure and the 
updated information on websites and from call centres. The industry has worked on this issue by monitoring 
the adherence of operators to a voluntary Code of Conduct for European operators for the purpose of 
enhancing the clarity of international retail roaming price information for consumers. 
 
3.4 Cost data  
In order to assess profit margins the Commission services requested specific data from the GSMA and from 
sixteen EU operators, selected to provide a representative sample of network size, roaming traffic volume 
and membership of alliance networks. Other data sources for the impact assessment included NRAs, 
commercial research and Commission’s internal resources.  
The GSMA has provided the Commission with copies of nominal IOTs, which are the rates operators would 
get if they did not have the buying power to negotiate discounts. Tariffs are available to operators on a 
confidential basis from GSMA.  
 
Nominal IOT discounting 
Profit margin calculations based on nominal IOTs would be understated, as they would be distorted by 
discounts negotiated between operators across borders. Nominal IOT prices do not represent the effective 
prices paid by operators, as volume discounts need to be subtracted. Operators belonging to alliances benefit 
from larger discounts.  
Bilateral and multilateral agreements typically have arrangements for offsetting roaming minutes as another 
form of wholesale discounting. Alliance members increasingly direct traffic towards other members of the 
alliance to benefit from their reciprocal wholesale pricing agreements and support a positive upward spiral of 
profit margins.  
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Price elasticity 
Although interested parties are looking at the same data, different conclusions are reached by regulators and 
operators. Most operators claim that competition in the wholesale market is working and is helping to bring 
down prices.  
However, retail prices may not always drop when wholesale prices decrease. Market forces are insufficient 
for price drops to be automatic. Market studies show that the overall demand in the market for international 
roaming services is inelastic, at both the retail and the wholesale level. As much as 60% of group profits for 
the larger operators come from business customers, which are less price-sensitive to the cost of international 
roaming calls. 
Measuring the response of retail prices to wholesale price fluctuations is not an easy task as changes in 
wholesale prices are decided through bilateral and multilateral agreements between operators.  
 
Margins 
The Commission calculates that at €1.15 per minute, the average retail charge for a roamed call is more than 
five times higher than the actual cost of providing wholesale service, and in some cases up to ten times 
higher. The GSMA has estimated that the annual gross contribution from roaming services in 2005 within the 
EU was €4.5 billion, but this is of course not a profit figure. It does not take into account mobile operators’ 
fixed costs, such as network infrastructure, sales and marketing, distribution and license fees, or the cost of 
originating or terminating a roaming call on the operator’s own network.  
The Commission’s documentation lists additional operational cost for supporting a roaming call at less than 
€0.20 in most cases. On received roaming calls, operators make retail margins of 300–400%.  
Operators defend the high margins on the basis that international roaming is part of a package of interrelated 
services to consumers. They attest that their packages offer good value for money and the total cost of these 
services to consumers has been falling for a sustained period. However there is no clear evidence that any of 
these services are run at a loss, or that high roaming prices are justified to compensate for the price of 
cheaper services.Mobile operators have requested the Commission to take into consideration detailed 
operational issues in the costing exercise, including administrative costs of roaming contracts, marketing, 
coverage of low population areas, billing and fraud management, and the operation of roaming signalling 
links.  
On the other hand, in order to be effective, wholesale regulation must facilitate the objective of lowering 
retail prices in a straightforward and effective manner. While a comprehensive costing exercise for all 
operators and regulators may be useful to determine the right level of roaming prices, that level would be a 
moving target and would require constant recalculation as the market continues to evolve in terms of roaming 
usage and operational costs.  
 
3.5 Conclusions on roaming data 
The breadth of international data on roaming prices, costing and market sizes has made data analysis a 
complex task. The statistics and results obtained have provided a foothold for financial, economic and legal 
debate, and it has given the stakeholders opportunities to attempt to play for time to delay the Commission’s 
plans for regulation. The information available via quantitative and qualitative methods is sufficient for the 
Commission to move ahead with an effective assessment of the market scenario. 
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4. FEASIBILITY OF TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
In this section we make an assessment of the technical feasibility of the implementation of the proposed 
measures by operators in a six-month transition period, as foreseen by Article 5 of the proposal. The 
assessment has to consider both the proposed measures – the specific transparency measures and the 
“European Home Market Approach” – in terms of technical and financial issues. 
 
4.1 The implementation of the specific transparency measures 
As we indicated in Section 1.1 (subsection on Methods of achieving greater tariff transparency), there are 
additional options, all based on the SMS tool, to achieve greater tariff transparency: a) Simple “push”; b) 
Simple “pull”; c) “Free pull”; d) “Advanced push”; e) “Hybrid push/pull”.  
The measure envisaged by the current proposal in Article 7 is the option under “Free pull”, by which home 
MNOs offer a free SMS/voice call service to their customers and constantly update them of any (significant) 
changes in roaming charges.  
With option 3 (Article 7 of the proposed regulation), uninformed consumers would be better off, as they 
would profit from a free service that provides them with valuable information. Informed consumers, on the 
other hand, might cross-subsidise uninformed ones through greater charges. If MNOs could not recover 
development costs through higher prices, consumers would in any event be affected in the medium term due 
to a reduction of investments by MNOs.  
The impact of option 3 coupled with a double cap regime would vary significantly among different MNOs 
and member states. In particular, less mature markets with higher network costs and MNOs with a small 
customer base would be more negatively affected than larger MNOs in more mature countries and MNOs 
forming groups or alliances. 
As described in Table 1, this option would not be easily implemented in the foreseen six-month transition 
period because the costs of implementation are significant and will be borne entirely by MNOs. 
The adoption of this measure, in fact, would require visited network service providers to keep constantly 
updated information on available retail prices; tariff schemes and user profiles would have to be simplified in 
order to keep down costs. In particular, less mature markets with higher network costs and MNOs with a 
small customer base would be more negatively affected than larger MNOs in more mature countries and 
MNOs forming groups or alliances. 
From a financial point of view, the implementation of the transparency measures contained in the proposal on 
international roaming charges would increase the costs for most MNOs, especially in countries where pre-
paid customers prevail. The free provision of tariff information may lead informed roamers to subsidise 
uninformed ones. If the cost of setting up the service could not be recovered, this might lead either to an 
increase in domestic charges or to a reduction in investments. Overall, the regulation may also result in cross-
border industry consolidation and alliances, and a loss of valuable service differentiation. On the operators’ 
side, there seems to be no need to increase the transparency of IOTs. This may, if anything, stimulate 
collusive bargaining if costs are below the caps selected by the Commission.  
Overall, if retail and wholesale caps are maintained in the final proposal, any requirement to impose costly 
transparency measures free of charge should be carefully considered under the proportionality principle: if 
price caps are meant as “safety nets” for consumers, then the option of gathering additional tariff information 
should not necessarily be offered for free. Likewise, with burdensome transparency measures in place, the 
need to impose retail price regulation becomes less evident.  
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4. 2 The implementation of the “European Home Market Approach” measure 
The proposal provides for the establishment, on the basis of the “European Home Market Approach”, of 
common, Europe-wide price limits on the charges that mobile network operators may levy for the wholesale 
provision of mobile roaming services for mobile voice telephony calls made from a visited network in the 
European Union and terminating on a public telephone network also located within it. 
The price limits take account of the differences in the underlying costs of providing international roaming 
services for calls made to a destination within a visited country, on the one hand, and calls made back home 
or to a third country within the EU, on the other. The proposal therefore calls for a lower wholesale price 
maximum for the former category of calls (set at twice the EU average mobile termination rate for mobile 
network operators designated as having significant market power) and a higher limit for the latter category 
(set at three times the EU average mobile termination rate for such operators). In order to ensure that there is 
no price squeeze in the provision of mobile roaming services at retail level, the proposal also provides for 
safeguard price limits at the retail level for the same categories of roaming calls, set at 130% of the applicable 
wholesale limit. In accordance with the European Home Market Approach, and in order to ensure that 
charges payable by roaming customers for receiving calls while roaming abroad in the EU more closely 
reflect the underlying costs incurred by their home mobile provider in providing this service, the proposal 
also provides that those charges should not exceed a maximum limit. The price limits provided with regard to 
the retail charges for the making of regulated roaming calls will take effect as a matter of law six months 
after the entry into force of the proposed measure. 
Article 4 of the proposal sets the maximum prices that can be charged at retail level by the home mobile 
provider for a regulated roaming call. This is 130% of the applicable maximum wholesale charge for that call 
(excluding VAT). Article 5 provides that the retail price limits in Article 4 will take effect after six months 
(“The obligations in Article 4 shall take effect six months after the entry into force of this Regulation”).  
One of the advantages of the European Home Market Approach over the regulatory approaches (e.g. Visited 
Country approach or Home Pricing approach) is its relatively easy monitoring and implementation.  
Capping at wholesale and retail level represents a relatively less intrusive regulatory approach, since it does 
not restrict competition below levels of pan-European prices. Operators do not have to follow the maximum 
price levels set by regulation and can still offer better deals to their customers (as it is currently the case in 
some countries or for some consumer segments). 
Overall costs depend principally on: number of subscribers, network infrastructure type (circuit v packet 
switched, fixed wireline mobile), range and types of services, business processes and billing integration to 
OSS/BSS among other factors. Staff form the major portion of operational costs, for up to several hundred 
people, which with other process costs makes billing-related costs a significant part of total OpEx. Running 
the billing systems includes tailoring them for special customer requirements, customer contact and care, 
cross-checking the input data (CDRs) and fraud management; all are labour intensive. Post-processing the 
bills (printing and posting bills to subscribers) is an additional cost. 
Allowing a transitional period of six months before the retail provisions on making calls come into effect 
would allow operators time to redefine pricing structures for active roaming calls.33 As we indicated in 
Section 2.9, price-capped roaming regimes could be effected reasonably quickly – in three months or so. The 
time required is that to update the billing systems, the roaming agreements, the business processes for setting 
rates, and possibly the interconnect systems and any checks on TAP files or possibly raw CDR data, as well 
as the customer-care processes. Billing systems can be updated by reprogramming if they are of the previous 
generation, or by operator resetting and perhaps reconfiguration of rating tables if they are of the current 
generation. The actual time required (including testing) varies from a few hours in the latter case and perhaps 
days to weeks in the former. Modifying the roaming agreements and business process change with retraining 
would probably take a month to six weeks, for both billing and CRM/customer care in parallel, with sales and 
marketing communications also in parallel. This is a typical timescale for rolling out a new mobile service 
product to market. However, as capping will require mandates through legislation, with potential legal 
challenges to be processed, a horizon of at least one or two years is realistic. There is also another possible 
retarding factor in that the larger GSM operators, and in particular those with a pan-European footprint, will 
ask for lower charges only in exchange for preferred roaming status.  
                                                     
33  (COM) (2006) Impact Assessment of 12.2.2006, p.50  
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Such a move could discriminate against mobile operators in downstream retail markets that do not have a 
pan-European footprint and so lack bargaining power. This issue will require EU-wide regulatory measures 
by the EC through NRAs. However there should not be any hindrance to price competition. The anti-
discrimination rules contained in licences, competition law or the GSM international roaming framework 
should not be applied in a way that impairs the continual downward adjustment of wholesale roaming 
charges through competition. Moreover, market forces, if allowed to operate by the NRAs, may also tend to 
work against preferential situations for the largest MNOs. 34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
34  Here we note that arbitrage by roaming brokers, new entrants and wider geographical markets on the retail roaming level would tend to work 
against preferential situations for the largest MNOs. 
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ANNEX I 
DEFINITIONS 
 
International roaming 
This means the use of a mobile telephone or other device by a roaming customer to make or receive calls 
while outside the member state in which the customer’s home network is located, by means of arrangements 
between the operator of the home network and the operator of the visited network. 
European Home Market Approach 
This is the common mechanism for ensuring that users of public mobile telephone networks when travelling 
within the EU do not pay excessive prices for international roaming services when making or receiving calls. 
It thereby provides a high level of consumer protection while safeguarding competition between mobile 
operators. The Home Approach lays down rules on the charges that may be levied by mobile operators for 
the provision of international roaming services for voice calls originating and terminating within the EU. It 
applies both to charges levied between network operators at wholesale level and to charges levied by the 
home provider at retail level. 
Home provider 
This refers to the undertaking that provides the roaming customer with terrestrial public mobile telephony 
services at retail level. 
Home network 
This means the terrestrial public mobile network located within a member state and used by the home 
provider for the provision of terrestrial public mobile telephony services to the roaming customer. 
Regulated roaming call 
This is a mobile voice telephony call made by a roaming customer, originating on a visited network and 
terminating on a public telephone network within the EU 
Roaming customer 
A roaming customer is a customer of a provider of terrestrial public mobile telephony services (supplied by 
means of a terrestrial public mobile network situated in the EU) who uses a mobile telephone or other device 
to make or receive calls on a visited network by means of arrangements between the operator of the home 
network and the operator of the visited network 
Visited network  
A visited network is a terrestrial public mobile telephony network situated in a member state other than that 
of the home network and permitting a roaming customer to make or receive calls by reason of arrangements 
with the operator of the home network. 
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ANNEX III 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AOC Advice of charge  
CAMEL Customized application of mobile enhanced logic 
CapEx Additional capital 
CDRs Call data records 
ERG European Regulatory Group 
GPRS General packet radio service 
GSM  Global system for mobile communications 
GSMA GSM Association 
HLR Local home location register 
ICT Information and communications technologies 
IMS IP multimedia subsystem 
IMSI International mobile subscriber identifier  
IN Intelligent network 
IOTs Inter-operator tariffs  
INTUG International Users Group 
IRTT International roaming tariff transparency  
MNOs Mobile network operators  
NRA National regulatory authority  
OpEx Operational expenditure  
OTA Over-the-air programming 
RPP Receiving Party Pays 
SCP Service control point 
SIM Subscriber identity module  
SMS Short message service 
STIRA Standard International Roaming Agreement 
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System  
USSD Unstructured supplementary services data 
WAP Wireless Application Protocol 
+++ 
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